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NOTES
RACKETEERS AND NON-RACKETEERS ALIKE SHOULD
FEAR FLORIDA'S RICO ACT
RAYMER F. MAGUIRE IIl
I. INTRODUCTION
The 1977 Florida Legislature determined that organized crime
was using vast amounts of money, violence, and intimidation to
infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business within Florida. In an ef-
fort to eliminate infiltration of legitimate businesses by racketeers,'
the legislature enacted the Florida RICO (Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organization) Act.'
RICO prohibits the use of a pattern or series of criminal acts to
conduct or acquire an organization or enterprise. While RICO is
directed against organized crime's use of continuing patterns of
criminal acts, it also reaches less sophisticated levels of criminal
1. Fla. S., Committee on Judiciary-Civil, Staff Analysis and Economic Statement (May
20, 1977) (on file with committee). An expert on organized crime and FEDRICO during
hearings provided the following scenario of what happens when organized crime infiltrates a
legitimate business:
Coin operated machines is a good example. What happens is other people don't
enter the business. People don't have free choice about the kinds of machines that
are put into the bars, and restaurants. In the state of Florida when Florida decides
to put an additional tax on cigarettes; to where it suddenly becomes profitable to
smuggle cigarettes down from North Carolina. Then the machines are operated by
organized crime, they begin selling stamped cigarettes, illegal stamped cigarettes,
to make more money out of it. The whole range of what. . . Look, it's an economic
activity, the purpose there is to make money. They are going to make money
without the normal limitations of law. So it's price fixing, market allocation, there's
extortion, there's tax evasion. There may well be wage and hour violations with
employees. There may well be sweetheart contracts with the unions that are asso-
ciated with the transportation of the cigarettes, transportation of the machines.
There is a range of things that will happen in that area. . . . The state that's
attempting to realize revenue on cigarettes loses revenue, I mean it's net loss of
revenue. The state then must make up that revenue in sales tax or income tax. The
legitimate distributors of cigarettes lose that aspect of the transaction, of the busi-
ness, so that the amount of cigarettes that are moving through legitimate commerce
actually decreases. It hurts everybody, really. It's a good easy example and it's one
that's real for Florida.
Fla. H.R., Select Committee on Organized Crime, transcript of proceedings at 76-77 (March
7, 1977) (on file with committee) (testimony of G. Robert Blakey) (Professor Blakey teaches
criminal law, criminal procedure, and organized crime control at Cornell Law School. As the
counsel to the United States Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedure, Profes-
sor Blakey participated in the drafting of the federal version of RICO).
2. Fla. RICO (Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization) Act, ch. 77-334, 1977
Fla. Laws 1399 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 905.34, 943.46-.464 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
RICO].
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activity. How far it reaches is an important concern, because the
penalty for violating RICO is severe-a maximum of thirty years
imprisonment and a fine of $10,000, or three times the gross value
gained or the loss caused by the racketeer.
3
RICO is patterned after federal legislation entitled the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.' Enacted in 1970, FED-
RICO has been used successfully against racketeers involved in ille-
gal gambling, 5 sophisticated fraud,6 and the corruption of labor offi-
cials.' Politicians 8 and police officers9 have been convicted of violat-
ing FEDRICO. It has withstood constitutional challenges of vague-
ness 10 and double jeopardy." Federal courts have ruled that it is not
an ex post facto law. 2
However, the scope of FEDRICO is more limited than that of
RICO. The predicate acts that trigger FEDRICO are usually limited
to felonies, while the acts that trigger RICO can be either felonies
or misdemeanors. For example, passing "bad" checks is not serious
enough to trigger FEDRICO, yet it is sufficient to trigger RICO.
This raises questions about the wisdom of the Florida act-
questions which lead to still more questions.
This note explains and critiques the scope of RICO as well as the
stated and inferred legislative intent behind it. A discussion of the
legislative intent in enacting the new statute concludes that while
the legislature wanted RICO to be a powerful weapon against organ-
3. FLA. STAT. § 943.463 (1977).
4. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1970) [hereinafter cited as FEDRICO].
5. United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925
(1975) (Cappetto allowed his telephone to be used for receiving and transmitting wagering
information).
6. United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975)
(Parness and his wife withheld funds owned by a hotel owner and then used the funds to buy
the hotel after causing the owner to default on a loan).
7. United States v. Kaye, 556 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1977) (Kaye accepted money from service
contractors for services as a union steward which he did not in fact provide).
8. United States v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 189 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (Fineman, Speaker of the
Pennsylvania House of Representatives, recommended acceptance of certain applications for
entrance to graduate school for a $10,000 to $15,000 fee).
9. United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1977) (Brown and others, former officers
of the Macon, Georgia, police department, were charged with violating FEDRICO by solicit-
ing and accepting bribes to protect persons involved in gambling, prostitution, and the illicit
marketing of whiskey).
10. United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Parness, 503
F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975); United States v. Cappetto, 502
F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
11. United States v. Frumento, 405 F. Supp. 23 (E.D. Pa. 1975); United States v. Amato,
367 F. Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
12. United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Ohlson, 552
F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); United
States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976).
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ized crime, lawmakers were also fearul that RICO might be applied
to persons committing relatively non-serious crimes such as passing
bad checks or failing to obtain governmental permits. Nevertheless,
RICO can be applied to such persons.
Amendments to RICO are suggested which would prevent its ap-
plication to persons committing relatively non-serious crimes, yet
preserve the act as a powerful anti-racketeering weapon. The
amendments are largely based on the language and principles in
FEDRICO which federal courts have construed and applied since
1970. If RICO is not amended, this note might serve the secondary
purpose of aiding Florida courts in the task of applying RICO as the
legislature intended it to be applied.
II. THE MECHANICS AND SCOPE OF RICO
A. The Prohibited Activities
It is prohibited under RICO to:
1 3
(1) use or invest proceeds derived from a "pattern of racketeering
activity" to establish or operate an enterprise or to acquire real
property;"
(2) acquire or maintain any interest or control in an enterprise or
real property through a "pattern of racketeering activity";'5
(3) participate as an employee or associate in any enterprise
through a "pattern of racketeering activity";"5 or
(4) conspire or endeavor to violate any of the above prohibited
activities.'
7
13. Basic to all the substantive RICO violations is the existence of an "enterprise" and
either a "pattern of racketeering activity" or the "collection of an unlawful debt." Discussion
in this note is limited to "pattern of racketeering activity" because RICO is rather clear in
its definition of an "unlawful debt."
14. FLA. STAT. § 943.462(1) (1977) provides:
It is unlawful for any person who has with criminal intent received any proceeds
derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through the
collection of an unlawful debt to use or invest, whether directly or indirectly, any
part of such proceeds, or the proceeds derived from the investment or use thereof,
in the acquisition of any title to, or any right, interest, or equity in, real property
or in the establishment or operation of any enterprise.
See generally Note, Investing Dirty Money: Section 1962 (a) of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970, 83 YALE L.J. 1491 (1974).
15. FiA. STAT. § 943.462(2) (1977) provides: "It is unlawful for any person, through a
pattern of racketeering activity or through the collection of an unlawful debt, to acquire or
maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise or real property."
16. Id. § 943.462(3) provides: "It is unlawful for any person employed by, or associated
with,. any enterprise to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in such enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt."
17. Id. § 943.462(4) provides: "It is unlawful for any person to conspire or endeavor to
violate any of the provisions of subsections (1), (2), or (3)."
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It is difficult to imagine a type of involvement with an enterprise
that is not prohibited by RICO once a "pattern of racketeering
activity" has been established. For instance, RICO prohibits the use
of a "pattern of racketeering activity" to acquire an enterprise,
whether it is bought or acquired through strong-arm tactics or not.
The statute prohibits the use of a "pattern of racketeering activity"
to operate an enterprise, whether a principal operates it or employ-
ees operate it. It prohibits too the use of a "pattern of racketeering
activity" to benefit from an enterprise, whether the benefit stems
from owning it or controlling it.
B. The Broad Scope of "Racketeering Activity"
Under FEDRICO, four groups of crimes make up the definition
of "racketeering activities.' 8 The first group includes any act or
threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery,
bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotics or other dangerous drugs,
which is chargeable under state law and punishable by imprison-
ment for more than one year.'9 The second group includes federal
crimes often committed by organized crime operatives, such as
sports bribery, counterfeiting, embezzlement from pension and wel-
fare funds, mail and wire fraud, obstruction of justice, obstruction
of a criminal investigation, and interstate transportation of stolen
property.20 The third group includes the indictable offenses under
sections 186 and 501(c) of title 29 which deal with the restrictions
on payments and loans to labor organizations and with the embez-
zlement of union funds.2 ' Last is the group of offenses involving
bankruptcy fraud, fraud in the sale of securities, and dangerous
drugs.2 2 Together, the crimes in these four groups comprise the
FEDRICO "racketeering activities." Only three of the individual
FEDRICO "racketeering activities" are misdemeanors. Two involve
bankruptcy fraud= and the third prohibits certain payments and
loans to labor organizations.
2 '
Under RICO, "racketeering activity" has been defined more
broadly than under FEDRICO. The RICO definition incorporates
by reference the entire FEDRICO definition.2 5 It also includes all the
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1970).
19. Id. § 1961(1)(A).
20. Id. § 1961(1)(B).
21. Id. § 1961(1)(C).
22. Id. § 1961(1)(D).
23. Id. §§ 154, 155.
24. 29 U.S.C. § 186 (Supp. V 1975).
25. FLA. STAT. § 943.461(1)(b) (1977).
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crimes chargeable under seventeen chapters and twenty-five sec-
tions of the Florida Statutes, 2 including such relatively minor offen-
ses as cutting off the ears of hogs, sheep or cattle before they have
been dressed; 27 "scalping" a sporting exhibition ticket in excess of
$1.00 above the original price; 28 knowingly providing false -informa-
tion to any law enforcement officer concerning the alleged commis-
sion of any crimes;29 knowingly selling any obscene, lewd, and lasci-
vious book or magazine; 30 and selling less than five grams of canna-
bis. 31 By including minor crimes such as these in the definition of
"racketeering activity," RICO clearly may be used against those
who are not, by any stretch of the imagination, racketeers.
The RICO definition of "racketeering activity" is also broader
than its FEDRICO counterpart in that, under RICO, a
"racketeering activity" can be an attempt to commit, a conspiracy
to commit, or a solicitation, coercion or intimidation of another
person to commit one of the enumerated crimes.3 2 In contrast, FED-
RICO has been construed to require that predicate crimes be proved
and does not allow prosecution for less than actual commission of
the specified crimes.
33
The definition of "racketeering activity" in FEDRICO has been
criticized as being "broad. 3 Yet RICO numerically covers more
crimes-many of which are misdemeanors. The number of crimes
subject to RICO are then multiplied by including attempts to com-
mit, conspiracies to commit, solicitation, coercion, and intimidation
of other persons to commit the specified crimes. The breadth of the
FEDRICO definition of racketeering activity pales in comparison to
the breadth of the RICO definition.
C. Does the Pattern Element Limit the Broad
Scope of Racketeering Activity?
After proving the presence of racketeering activities in FEDRICO,
the United States Attorney must prove that those activities are in
26. Id. § 943.461(1)(a)1-25.
27. Id. § 817.27, as prescribed in id. § 943.461(1)(a)16.
28. Id. § 817.36, as prescribed in id. § 943.461(1)(a)16.
29. Id. § 837.05, as prescribed in id. § 943.461(1)(a)19.
30. Id. § 847.011, as prescribed in id. § 943.461(1)(a)22.
31. Id. § 893.13(1)(f), as prescribed in id. § 943.461(1)(a)24.
32. Id. § 943.461(1).
33. United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 441 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105
(1975); United States v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 189, 194 (E.D. Pa. 1977); United States v.
Amato, 367 F. Supp. 547, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
34. Comment, Organized Crime and the Infiltration of Legitimate Business: Civil Reme-
dies for "Criminal Activity," 124 U. PA. L. REv. 192, 194 (1975).
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a pattern.15 Racketeering activities may not be isolated, discon-
nected incidents, but must be connected with each other by some
common scheme, plan, or motive."
Under FEDRICO, a "pattern of racketeering activity" requires
the commission of at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of
which must have occurred after the effective date of the statute.37
Only one court has found a pattern based on just two racketeering
activities.3 8 Instead, most courts have interpreted the word
''pattern" as requiring a continuity of racketeering activity.
For instance, in United States v. Stofsky 39 a federal court con-
strued the word "pattern" in a situation where union officials and
employees were charged with accepting illegal payments from em-
ployers. The court drew from civil rights law, where a "pattern" has
been deemed to involve more than just isolated or accidental
events.40 It also drew from the definition of "pattern of criminal
conduct" in title X of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970:
"criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, par-
ticipants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are inter-
related by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated
events. ' 41 The Stofsky court said that "in spite of the quantitative
nature (at least two racketeering activities) of the § 1961 definition
of 'pattern' [of racketeering activity] the major concern of Con-
gress, when it enacted § 1961 et seq. was the special danger to
legitimate businesses of a continuity of racketeering activity.
4 2
And, in United States v. White, a federal court ruled that the word
"pattern" was not vague because it could be construed as meaning
"a combination of qualities or acts forming a consistent or charac-
teristic arrangement."' 3 The court supported its decision by point-
ing out that the defendant's commission of mail fraud and interstate
transportation of stolen property was "part of a particular continu-
ing criminal activity.""
In United States v. Morris,'5 the Fifth Circuit ruled that several
card games occurring over a nineteen-month period formed an easily
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1970).
36. United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1970). The effective date was Oct. 15, 1970.
38. United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105
(1975).
39. United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
40. Id. at 613-14 (citing United States v. Gilman, 341 F. Supp. 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)).
41. Id. at 614 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1970)).
42. 409 F. Supp. at 614 (emphasis added).
43. 386 F. Supp. 882, 883 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
44. Id.
45. 532 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1976).
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recognized pattern. The pattern included trips to Nevada, private
card games in the defendant's hotel room, the presence of stooged
poker players, the use of prearranged card decks, and other cheating
techniques which constituted a "pattern of racketeering activity."
The court in United States v. Field" followed the logic of the Morris
court in ruling that fourteen separate "racketeering activities"
within a four-year period constituted a clear pattern of racketeering
conduct. And, in United States v. Kaye,47 the Seventh Circuit held
that the commission of seventy-four racketeering activities over a
four-and-one-half-year period constituted a "pattern of racketeering
activity" because it was continuous and related criminal activity.
In Kaye, the defendant was convicted of seventy-four counts of
accepting money from service contractors for services as a union
steward which he did not in fact provide.
An important decision which appears to contradict the weight of
authority requiring continuous activity to establish a "pattern of
racketeering activity" is United States v. Parness. 1s In Parness the
Second Circuit found a pattern of racketeering activity based on two
acts of interstate transportation of cashier's checks, the money for
which had been stolen or converted. Moreover, the two acts occurred
only five days apart, and, for all practical purposes, were part of one
criminal episode. However, as pointed out the following year by the
district court in United States v. Moeller,49 since the two acts in
Parness were part of a lengthy, sophisticated, and fraudulent
scheme to take over a hotel, one could infer that the closely related
acts were actually part of a pattern. Given that inference, the reli-
ance in Parness on just two racketeering activities is congruous with
the presence of continuing criminal activity in Stofsky, White,
Kaye, and Moeller.
The RICO definition of "pattern of racketeering activity" sug-
gests that the similarity and interrelatedness of racketeering activi-
ties should be stressed in determining whether a "pattern of racket-
eering activities" exists. This emphasis is built into the definition:
" 'Pattern of racketeering activity' means engaging in at least two
incidents of racketeering conduct that have the same or similar
intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of commission or
otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are
46. 432 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (Field was charged with violating FEDRICO and
unlawfully demanding and receiving money from an employer of longshoremen).
47. 556 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1977).
48. 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
49. 402 F. Supp. 49, 58 n.7 (D. Conn. 1975) (defendants were charged with various offenses
arising out of an alleged arson of a business plant).
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not isolated incidents . . .",0
It is difficult to determine whether Florida courts will require
continuity of "racketeering activities" as well as similarity or inter-
relatedness among them. Merely requiring similarity and interrela-
tedness aids RICO prosecutors. But imposing the FEDRICO re-
quirement of continuity makes prosecution more difficult.
"Racketeering activities" often have the "same or similar intents,
results, accomplices, victims, or methods of commission or other-
wise are interrelated."'" If a criminal commits the same
"racketeering activity" twice in the same general manner, he is
guilty of violating the RICO statute because the two acts are likely
to "have the same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims,
or methods of commission, or otherwise [be] interrelated by distin-
guishing characteristics and . . not [be] isolated incidents."52
If the "pattern" element in RICO can be satisfied too easily, then
RICO may well be applied to non-racketeers who have committed
only relatively minor crimes such as possession of an explosive with-
out a license or permit;3 storage of alcoholic beverages in a place
other than the building or room approved by the Division of Alco-
holic Beverages and Tobacco for a given vendor; 4 intentionally
touching or striking another person against the will of the other
person;55 carrying a pistol without having a license from the local
county commissioners;" or making a check to another, knowing at
the time that there are insufficient funds on deposit with which to
pay the check.57 A judicial construction of "pattern" including the
continuity concept would to some degree protect non-racketeers
from RICO's broad definition of "racketeering activity." If commit-
ted in some sort of a "pattern," the crimes mentioned could and
probably would trigger a RICO violation. This should be avoided.
Non-racketeers should be insulated from the severity of the first-
degree felony conviction under Florida's racketeering statute.
Since a RICO conviction has such grave consequences, the legisla-
ture and the courts should carefully consider the construction given
to "pattern." If a "pattern" can be demonstrated simply by a show-
ing of similarity and interrelatedness among "racketeering activi-
ties," many perpetrators of minor crimes may be potential violators
50. FLA. STAT. § 943.461(4) (1977).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. § 552.101, as prescribed in id. § 943.461(1)(a)6.
54. Id. § 562.03, as prescribed in id. § 943.461(1)(a)7.
55. Id. § 784.03(1)(a), as prescribed in id. § 943.461(1)(a)10.
56. Id. § 790.05, as prescribed in id. § 943.461(1)(a)12.
57. Id. § 832.05(2)(a), as prescribed in id. § 943.461(1)(a)18.
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of RICO. However, if the "pattern" element requires proof that a
continuity of particular criminal activity exists, RICO will be used
more appropriately against the professional criminal. This would
seem to be more in keeping with the motivations of the legislature
in enacting the statute.
D. Does the "Enterprise" Element
Limit the Scope of "Racketeering Activity"?
FEDRICO defines "enterprise" as including "any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any
union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity."58 The definition is very broad, and, as an element of a
FEDRICO violation, has blocked few convictions. A temporary ex-
ception was United States v. Moeller," where the court reasoned
that FEDRICO did not encompass unlawful ventures. The court
held that although a group of individuals associated for the purpose
of burning and destroying buildings was clearly an enterprise, it was
not a legitimate enterprise. The court was persuaded by legislative
history which indicated that FEDRICO was enacted to resist the
infiltration of organized crime into legitimate businesses. However,
the Second Circuit in United States v. Altese overruled Moeller on
this point, holding that FEDRICO clearly extended to illegitimate
businesses as well as to legitimate ones. 0 The Second Circuit's posi-
tion is the same as that taken by the Seventh Circuit.' Foreign
businesses, 2 periodic card games, 3 labor unions,64 police depart-
ments, 5 small businesses," government agencies," organized prosti-
tution rings," and a two-person bribery operation" have also been
58. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1970).
59. 402 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975).
60. 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
61. United States v. Kaye, 556 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. Cappetto, 502
F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974).
62. United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105
(1975).
63. United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1976).
64. United States v. Kaye, 556 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1977).
65. United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1977).
66. United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975) (Campanale was convicted
of conspiring to conduct.a pattern of racketeering activity by intimidating and forcing meat
packers to contract for certain company services).
67. United States v. Frumento, 405 F. Supp. 23 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (the Bureau of Cigarette
and Beverage Taxes in Pennsylvania was found to be an "enterprise.")
68. United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1977) (defendants were convicted
of various federal offenses as a result of their lucrative enterprise in Tampa, Florida, which
specialized in prostitution).
69. United States v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 189 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
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held to satisfy the definition of "enterprise" in FEDRICO.
The RICO definition of "enterprise" is even broader than that in
FEDRICO. The Florida law follows the FEDRICO definition by
applying the law to individuals, partnerships, corporations, associa-
tions, legal entities, unions, and groups of individuals associated in
fact although not a legal entity.70 The legislature obviously learned
from the federal decisions, because it added to the definition of
enterprise sole proprietorships, business trusts, illicit as well as licit
enterprises, and governmental as well as other entities.7 ' Conse-
quently, the legislature kept the Florida courts from having to face
litigation similar to that which has occurred in the federal courts.7"
Since the "enterprise" element has blocked few FEDRICO convic-
tions,73 it is apparent that, on the federal level, the "enterprise"
requirement has not significantly limited the application of FED-
RICO. Since the definition of "enterprise" in RICO is even broader
than that in FEDRICO, it is very unlikely that the "enterprise"
element will help limit the application of the Florida statute pri-
marily to racketeers.
E. Penalties and Remedies
A person convicted under RICO is guilty of a first-degree felony
punishable by a term of imprisonment not to exceed thirty years
and a fine not to exceed $10,000.11 The court can set a higher fine,
provided the fine does not exceed three times the gross value gained
or lost as a result of violating RICO.75 Court costs and reasonable
costs of investigation and prosecution can be added to the alterna-
tive fine. For example, if a pattern of heroin trafficking resulted in
$1,000,000 gross value gained, a court could sentence the RICO
violator to pay $3,000,000 plus the allowable costs.
RICO may also be used in civil prosecutions. 76 The same essential
elements as in a criminal prosecution must be proved, but by the
lesser standard of proof applicable in civil cases.77 Upon proof of a
70. Compare FLA. STAT. § 943.461(3) (1977) with 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1970).
71. FLA. STAT. § 943.461(3) (1977).
72. See, e.g., United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1039 (1977); United States v. Frumento, 405 F. Supp. 23 (E.D. Pa. 1975); United States v.
Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975).
73. E.g., United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976); United States v.
Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975).
74. FLA. STAT. § 943.463(2) (1977).
75. Id.
76. Id. § 943.464.
77. See United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 925 (1975).
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RICO violation, a circuit court may order the defendant in a civil
case to divest himself of any interest in any enterprise, impose rea-
sonable restrictions on future activities or investments, order the
forfeiture of the charter of the corporation involved, or suspend or
revoke the licenses granted to any enterprise by any department or
agency of the state. 8
Any state agency having jurisdiction over the alleged racketeering
activities may institute civil proceedings. 79 Any person who is or
may in the future be damaged in his person, business, or property
by reason of a RICO violation has a cause of action for compensatory
and punitive damages, court costs, and reasonable attorney's fees. 0
One of the most interesting provisions under the civil remedies sec-
tion is that a finding of guilt in any criminal RICO proceeding estops
the defendant from denying the essential allegations of the criminal
offense in any subsequent civil proceedings." As a group, the crimi-
nal and civil remedies are broad and flexible. A violator of RICO can
be brought into court by various state agencies, by state attorneys,
and by private individuals.
The United States used the FEDRICO civil remedy in United
States v. Cappetto.8 2 The defendants were receiving horse race and
other sports wagers and transmitting wagering information. In addi-
tion to seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions to restrain
the defendants from engaging in the illegal gambling operation, the
federal government sought divestiture of Cappetto's interest in the
building being used by the defendants, disclosure of the identities
of those persons acting in concert with the defendants in the gam-
bling business, and an order directing each of the defendants to
submit quarterly income reports for the past ten years to the United
States Attorney. Relying on the fifth amendment, the defendants
refused to comply with discovery orders and refused even to appear
for depositions. The defendants unsuccessfully argued that the ac-
tion under the civil remedies of RICO was essentially a criminal
proceeding and that, therefore, they were entitled to the rights guar-
anteed by the Constitution to defendants in criminal cases. The
Seventh Circuit ruled that "acts which may be prohibited by Con-
gress may be made the subject of both criminal and civil proceed-
ings, and the prosecuting arm of the government may be authorized
78. FLA. STAT. § 943.464(1) (1977).
79. Id. § 943.464(5).
80. Id. § 943.464(7).
81. Id. § 943.464(8).
82. 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
1978]
494 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:483
to elect to bring a civil or criminal action, or both."83 The court also
ruled that the standard of proof was lower in civil proceedings than
in criminal proceedings under the same statutes 4 and that the
"[d]efendants ha[d] no more right to refuse . . . to submit to
questioning than any other party in a civil case."85
F. Statewide Grand Jury
In addition to its other provisions, RICO amended section 905.34,
Florida Statutes,8 6 to give the statewide grand jury subject matter
jurisdiction over "any violation of the provisions of the Florida
RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization) Act." Since
the statewide grand jury was instituted largely because of organized
crime, it is proper to extend its jurisdiction to RICO violations.
8 7
Florida's most recent statewide grand jury has already employed
this new power in indicting a reputed associate of the Carlo Gam-
bino Mafia Family for a RICO violation. 8
G. Summary of the RICO Elements
To review, the elements of a RICO violation include:
(1) "pattern of racketeering activity," which can be broken down
into:
(a) "pattern," meaning under RICO two or more incidents
of racketeering activities with the same or similar distin-
guishing characteristics,89 or, under FEDRICO, two or more
incidents of racketeering activities which are "part of a par-
ticular continuing criminal activity";" and
(b) "racketeering activity," which includes the FEDRICO
"racketeering activities,"'" the laws in seventeen chapters
and twenty-five sections of Florida Statutes," and the at-
tempts and conspiracies to commit the above crimes, as well
as solicitations, coercions, and intimidations of other persons
to commit them;1
3
83. Id. at 1357.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1359.
86. (1975).
87. FLA. STAT. § 905.32 (1977). This section is entitled "Legislative intent." Usually ex-
press legislative intent is not incorporated into a statute.
88. Tampa Tribune, Feb. 22, 1978, § B, at 3, col. 1.
89. FLA. STAT. § 943.461(4) (1977).
90. United States v. White, 386 F. Supp. 882, 883 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
91. FLA. STAT. § 943.461(1)(b) (1977).
92. Id. § 943.461(1)(a)1-25.
93. Id. §-943.461(1).
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(2) enterprise, which includes almost every legal and illegal en-
tity imaginable;"4 and
(3) a broad range of prohibited activities such as:
(a) using or investing racketeer proceeds;95
(b) acquiring or maintaining an enterprise through racket-
eering;9"
(c) participating as an employee in an enterprise through
racketeering;97 and
(d) conspiring or endeavoring to violate RICO.
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND INTENT
The committee discussion and the floor debate leading up to pas-
sage of the RICO statute evince a legislative intent to confine the
definition of "racketeering activity" under the new law primarily to
felonies. The potential broadness of the definition of "racketeering
activity" has been demonstrated. The relative uselessness of em-
ploying "pattern," "enterprise," and the other elements involved to
narrow the scope of the statute has also been shown. The legislative
history points to the conclusion that the legislature inadvertently
made RICO broader than it intended.
Senator Edgar Dunn, a Democrat from Daytona Beach, was the
prime sponsor of RICO and supervised its amendatory process in the
senate.9 As chairman of the Senate Judiciary-Criminal Committee,
Senator Dunn was able to focus that committee's time and resources
on RICO. He worked closely with committee staff and with an ex-
pert on FEDRICO to produce the versions of RICO introduced in
both the house and senate. 00 He probably understood RICO better
than any other legislator.
On May 4, 1977, when the merits of RICO were debated on the
senate floor, Senator Dunn was the spokesman for the bill. 0' He
94. Id. § 943.461(3).
95. Id. § 943.462(1).
96. Id. § 943.462(2).
97. Id. § 943.462(3).
98. Id. § 943.462(4).
99. Florida Times-Union, May 27, 1977, § B, at 2, col. 3.
100. Fla. S., Committee on Judiciary-Civil, tape recording of proceedings (May 20, 1977)
(on file with committee). Senator Dunn told the committee that "[Tlhe House version is
our fifth draft [of RICO]." The house version is identical to one of the working drafts (on
file with the Florida State University Law Review) produced by the Senate Committee on
Judiciary-Criminal except that the house version was amended by the House Committee on
Criminal Justice to allow the involved law enforcement agencies to split up the proceeds
derived from forfeitures resulting from RICO violations. Fla. HB 2127, § 4(4) (1977). Much
of the debate in the house concerned this amendment to the senate's working draft. Fla. H.R.,
tape recording of proceedings (May 2, 1977) (on file with clerk of house).
101. Fla. S., tape recording of proceedings (on file with secretary of senate).
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started the senate's discussion and, in subsequent debate, he de-
fended the bill by reference to a FEDRICO case that took place in
Florida:
In the Cloud case in Tampa, the pattern of extortion, assault, and
violence-including the murder, I might add, of a police officer-
. . . were the acts of racketeering activity. Those acts were used
to further an operation, a business enterprise. What was the
enterprise? It was a vending machine corporation. All right, the
way they kept the business going was by extortion, by murder, and
by threats of violence to people who wouldn't put those machines
in and who were extorted out of their money when they got [them]
in there."'
Dunn's defense was prompted by the comments of several sena-
tors who were concerned that RICO could be easily abused. Senator
Lori Wilson said:
In my mind, and I think in the mind of the citizens, racketeering
means organized crime, mafia, whatever you want to call it. Now
if I read your definition [of racketeering activities] here though,
that's not what we're really talking about. ... [F]or instance, if
you violate a Florida statute on profanity and you do it more than
once-and there [are not] many people in the room that
(haven't) -you're a racketeer. That doesn't follow to me. Prostitu-
tion, of course, that's illegal, but what if you're convicted twice or
three or four times on a prostitution charge, does that make you a
racketeer if you're working as a sole person?
3
Earlier, Senator Jack Gordon had objected to the "dangerous
special racketeer" provision in RICO which provided for increased
punishment for such racketeers. His objections stemmed, at least
partially, from the use of vague terms like "abnormal mental condi-
tion," "manual dexterity," and "special skill or expertise" to de-




104. Id.; Fla. CS for SB 960 (1977). The "dangerous special racketeer" provision was
patterned after 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1970), which is entitled "Increased sentence for dangerous
special offenders." This federal statute authorized additional sentences of 25 years imprison-
ment or less for defendants designated as dangerous adult special offenders. A defendant is
such a special offender if the felony he committed was part of a pattern of criminal conduct
which constituted a substantial source of the defendant's income, and if, in the commission
of the felony, the defendant manifested special skill or expertise. "[Slpecial skill or expertise
in criminal conduct includes . . . manual dexterity, facilitating the initiation, organizing,
planning, financing, direction, management, supervision, execution or concealment of crimi-
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Senator Gordon also objected to a provision which would have
amended Florida's wiretap statute to permit wiretaps for suspected
RICO violations. He feared that an extension of the wiretap statute
to RICO would result in too many abuses. He argued that the
amendment would have allowed wiretapping even if you were sus-
pected of smuggling cigarettes into the state.' °5 Senator Gordon de-
scribed RICO as "condoning the trampling on liberties of Americans
under the guise of fighting organized crime."'' 0
Because of these objections, the senate voted to return RICO to
the Judiciary-Criminal Committee for further consideration.'07 The
committee decided the senate would be more likely to pass RICO if
it were shorter than the twenty-five page version which had been
debated.10 Accordingly, they pared RICO down to almost half its
original size. They deleted the "dangerous special racketeer" provi-
sion, the civil investigation provision, the amendment to the wire-
tap statute, and all the crimes enumerated in the definition of
"racketeering activity" which were objected to during senate de-
bate. The provisions for public assistance fraud and prostitution by
a sole person were retained.' 9
The committee also deleted from the definition of "racketeering
activity" crimes which had not been objected to on the senate floor.
Those crimes, primarily misdemeanors, involved nonproperty tax
crimes, charitable funds, unfair trade practices, mortgaged prop-
erty, defamation, regulation of dog and horse racing, regulation of
jai alai frontons, and real property contracts."10
In its decision to delete a particular crime from the definition, the
committee relied on Senator Dunn's "felony rule" which, roughly
speaking, meant that Florida's definition of "racketeering activity"
should be limited to felonies."' Senator Dunn later qualified the
"felony rule" by saying, "We're inclding things that are used by
organized crime, like prostitution and gambling in that context.
Those are really the only exceptions.""'
nal conduct, the enlistment of accomplices in such conduct, or the disposition of the fruits
or proceeds of such conduct." 18 U.S.C. J 3575 (1970).
105. Fla. S., tape recording of proceedings (May 4, 1977) (on file with secretary of senate).
106. Florida Times-Union, May 27, 1977, § B, at 2, col. 3.
107. FLA. S. Jow. 327 (Reg. Sess. 1977).
108. Fla. S., Committee on Judiciary-Criminal, tape recording of proceedings (May 9,
1977) (on file with committee).
109. Compare Fla. S., tape recording of proceedings (May 4,1977) (on file with secretary)
and Fla. CS for SB 960 (1977) with Fla. S., Committee on Judiciary-Civil, Staff Analysis and
Economic Statement (May 20, 1977) (on file with committee).
110. Id.
111. Fla. S., Committee on Judiciary-Criminal, tape recording of proceedings (May 9,
1977) (on file with committee).
112. Id.
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Applying the "felony rule," the committee decided that organized
crime used obscene acts and distribution of obscene literature, so
misdemeanors relating to those acts were retained in the defini-
tion."3 For similar reasons, cigarette tax evasion was retained be-
cause cigarette smuggling can "be a big business with the disparity
of taxes between North Carolina and Florida." ' The committee
also decided to retain selected misdemeanors involving dog and
horse racing, jai alai frontons, prostitution, worthless checks, and
gambling."5 These specific misdemeanors are only a small part of
the ones included in the definition of "racketeering activity." The
committee did not discuss the hundreds of others still covered by
the definition.
To understand how so many misdemeanors could be retained in
the definition of "racketeering activity'! without discussion, one
must realize that the committee was editing a definition which in-
cluded all the misdemeanors and felonies in twenty-seven chapters
of the Florida Statutes."6 The committee deleted seven entire chap-
ters and particular sections from five others." 7 However, there were
still seventeen chapters that the committee did not even discuss."'
Of those seventeen chapters, thirteen chapters contain numerous
misdemeanors relating to beverage law enforcement, interest and
usurious practices, assault and battery, kidnapping, weapons and
firearms, arson, robbery, fraudulent practices, forgery, worthless
checks, perjury, obstruction of justice, and drug abuse.
Since the committee intended that only felonies and selected mis-
demeanors be part of the definition of "racketeering activity," there
are probably a substantial number of misdemeanors within those
thirteen chapters which the committee did not intend to include in
113. Id.
114. Id. (statement of Sen. McClain). Evasion of paying cigarette taxes is a misdemeanor
only for the first conviction. Subsequent convictions are felonies. FLA. STAT. § 210.18(1)
(1977).
115. Fla. S., Committee on Judiciary-Civil, Staff Analysis and Economic Statement
(May 20, 1977) (on file with committee); Fla. S., Committee on Judiciary-Criminal, tape
recording of proceedings (May 9, 1977) (on file with committee).
116. Fla. CS for SB 960, § 2(1)(a) (1977).
117. Compare Fla. CS for SB 960, § 2(1)(a) (1977) with Fla. S., Committee on Judiciary-
Civil, Staff Analysis and Economic Statement (May 20, 1977) (on file with committee).
118. Fla. S., Committee on Judiciary-Criminal, tape recording of proceedings (May 9,
1977) (on file with committee); see FLA. STAT. ch. 517 (1977) (sale of securities); id. ch. 552
(manufacture, distribution, and use of explosives); id. ch. 562 (beverage law enforcement);
id. ch. 687 (usurious practices); id. ch. 782 (homicide); id. ch. 784 (assault and battery); id.
ch. 787 (kidnapping); id. ch. 790 (weapons and firearms); id. ch. 806 (arson); id. ch. 812
(robbery); id. ch. 817 (fraudulent practices); id. ch. 831 (counterfeiting); id. ch. 832 (worthless
checks); id. ch. 837 (perjury); id. ch. 838 (bribery); id. ch. 843 (obstruction of justice); and
id. ch. 893 (lrug abuse).
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the definition of "racketeering activity." For example, had Senator
George Williamson known, he probably would not have approved of
"racketeering activity" being defined as the failure of a common
carrier of beverage to file monthly reports with the Division of Alco-
holic Beverages and Tobacco." 9 When the committee was selecting
the racketeering activities from the chapter relating to horse tracks,
Senator Williamson said that the definition of "racketeering activ-
ity" should not include laws that require "reports to be filed on
time.",2 0
Similarly, Senator Harry Johnston did not want the definition to
include the misdemeanor of knowingly passing a worthless check if
passing two bad checks was "going to be a pattern of racketeer-
ing.""' Nevertheless, Senator Johnston declined to delete it be-
cause, as he understood RICO, the checkwriters must use their ille-
gally gotten proceeds "for some purpose toward racketeering."'22
That interpretation of RICO is incorrect because the pattern of
racketeering is relevant only as to the source of illegal proceeds. It
is true that the proceeds of racketeering must be invested or used
in some enterprise, but they need not be used "for some purpose
toward racketeering." Senator Johnston did not want two bad
checks to constitute a "pattern of racketeering activity," yet such a
result is possible by having the worthless check statute in the defini-
tion of "racketeering activity."
Except for the worthless check statute, the misdemeanors which
the committee discussed and retained involved activities which a
FEDRICO expert had suggested might be violated by organized
crime operatives in Florida.'1 In contrast, beverage report laws,
worthless check statutes, and many other laws in the thirteen chap-
ters were not mentioned by the expert during hearings on organized
crime.
It appears that the committee inadvertently skipped over at least
some of the thirteen chapters containing misdemeanors. It simply
is not consistent to conclude that the committee wanted laws requir-
ing reports from the beverage industry included in the definition of
racketeering activity, yet not laws requiring reports from the jai alai
industry. Nor is it comprehensible that the committee wanted the
119. Id. § 562.20(1), as prescribed in id. § 943.461(1)(a).
120. Fla. S., Committee on Judiciary-Criminal, tape recording of proceedings (May 9,
1977) (on file with committee).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Fla. S., Committee on Judiciary-Criminal, tape recording of proceedings (March 8,
1977) (on file with committee) (testimony of G. Robert Blakey). He considered prostitution,
pornography, and gambling as areas in which organized crime might be operating.
19781
500 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:483
investment or use of proceeds from any two worthless checks to
constitute a violation of RICO. It is inconsistent too that the com-
mittee would spend hours deleting gambling and prostitution mis-
demeanors, yet purposely leave all the misdemeanors in the chap-
ters relating to beverage law enforcement, interest and usurious
practices, kidnapping, weapons and firearms, arson, larceny, fraud-
ulent practices, forgery, worthless checks, perjury, obstruction of
justice, and drug abuse.
The Judiciary-Criminal Committee finished its major editing of
the senate version of RICO after a long meeting on May 9, 1977.14
By then the house of representatives had unanimously passed its
version of RICO and the bill was before the Senate Judiciary-
Criminal Committee for review.'25 Since the house version was basi-
cally an earlier draft of the senate version, the committee did not
bother to analyze the substantive content of the house bill. How-
ever, it did choose to use the house version-House Bill 2127-as a
vehicle for the legislative process by striking its substantive content
and replacing it with the then edited senate version.' The bill
leaving the senate committee was House Bill 2127-as amended by
that committee.
The bill then went to the Senate Judiciary-Civil Committee.'2
That committee expanded the definition of "racketeering activity"
to include all the misdemeanors and felonies in the chapter in the
Florida Statutes on assault, battery, and culpable negligence.'2 The
124. Fla. S., Committee on Judiciary-Criminal, tape recording of proceedings (May 9,
1977) (on file with committee).
125. FA. H.R. Jou. 416 (Reg. Seas. 1977). RICO was, for the most part, produced by the
Senate Committee on Judiciary-Criminal. The House Committee on Criminal Justice and
its Select Committee on Organized Crime were only slightly involved in the drafting of RICO.
The house committee's involvement with RICO was limited to Professor G. Robert Blakey's
testimony on the infiltration of organized crime into legitimate businesses, quoted in note 1
supra, and the later deleted amendment to permit the involved law enforcement agencies to
split up the proceeds derived from forfeitures resulting from RICO violations, discussed in
note 100 supra. Activity on the floor of the house was for the most part limited to a general
explanation that RICO would prohibit organized crime operatives from investing their ille-
gally gotten proceeds in'legitimate enterprises, to a discussion of the proceeds amendment
authored by the House Committee on Criminal Justice, to an amendment drawn from the
senate version of RICO which gave statewide grand juries jurisdiction to investigate possible
violations of RICO, Fla. H., tape recording of proceedings (May 2, 1977) (on file with clerk
of house), and to an amendment deleting an affirmative defense, quoted in note 140 infra.
126. See FLA. H.R. JouR. 846 (Reg. Seas. 1977).
127. LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION DIVISION, JOINT LEGIsLATIvE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE, His-
TORY OF LEGISLATION, 1977 REGULAR SEssION, FLORIDA LEGISLATURE 503 (House Bill Actions
Report).
128. Compare Fla. S., Committee on Judiciary-Civil, Staff Analysis and Economic State-
ment (May 20, 1977) (on file with committee) and Fla. S., Committee on Judiciary-Criminal,
tape recording of proceedings (May 9, 1977) (on file with committee) with Fla. CS for SB 960
(1977).
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civil committee also amended the first part of the definition of
"racketeering activity" by deleting the provision that " '[racke-
teering conduct' means engaging in: (a) Any conduct in violation of
the following provisions of law . . ." In its place the committee
substituted the provision that "'[riacketeering activity' means to
commit, to attempt to commit, to conspire to commit, or to solicit,
coerce, or intimidate another person to commit: (a) Any crime
which is chargeable by indictment or information under the fol-
lowing provisions of the Florida Statutes . . ... The analyst for
the Judiciary-Civil Committee explained to the committee that the
amendment was needed because the word "engaging" made the
original provision vague.'1° He also said the change would allow
RICO to reach not just "the individuals actually committing the
crime, but everyone involved," including persons attempting to
commit, conspiring to commit, or soliciting, coercing, or intimidat-
ing another person to commit the enumerated racketeering activi-
ties.
13'
Robert E. Stone, president of the Florida Prosecuting Attorneys
Association, said that in talking about combating organized crime
it is necessary to go after "the person who is sitting up there master-
minding it.1 ' 32 He said that the amendment "goes to a person who
might intimidate a person or coerce a person into committing" rack-
eteering activities.
33
The committee did not discuss whether the misdemeanors in the
thirteen unedited chapters should be retained. Senator Dunn told
them that the Judiciary-Criminal Committee had already applied
the general principle of not retaining in the definition of "'racke-
teering activity' offenses that were merely misdemeanors, except
in the area of gambling and prostitution.'
34
It is noteworthy that Senator David McClain, a member of both
senate judiciary committees, expressed a desire that the Judiciary-
Civil Committee specify the "serious offenses" it wanted defined as
"racketeering activity."' 35 He did not want the committee to use the
"shotgun approach" by incorporating every crime in entire chap-
ters. Unfortunately, Senator McClain did not pursue this concern
because he was convinced by Stone that his concern was "protected
129. Id.
130. Fla. S., Committee on Judiciary-Civil, tape recording of proceedings (May 20, 1977)
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by the amendment . . . which requires that the [racketeering
activity] be a crime that is chargeable by indictment or informa-
tion. ... [A]ny provision of [chapter] 550 that is not a crime or
chargeable by information of indictment would be excluded under
the definition you adopted on page one."'3 6
Stone correctly observed that the amendment excludes statutory
prohibitions which are not crimes or chargeable by information or
indictment. He was incorrect, however, when he said Senator
McClain's concern was "protected." The definition of "racketeering
activity" still includes the misdemeanors in the thirteen chapters in
which the "shotgun approach" was used. Misdemeanors are not
excluded by the phrase "chargeable by information or indict-
ment"-because all crimes, misdemeanors and felonies, -are charge-
able in that manner. The amendment does exclude noncriminal
regulations and civil infractions, such as traffic tickets, since they
are not crimes or chargeable by information or indictment. Yet Sen-
ator McClain was not concerned with those kinds of non-serious
crimes. He, like the Judiciary-Criminal Committee, was concerned
with misdemeanors.
After the Judiciary-Civil Committee had made its changes,
House Bill 2127 was placed on the Special Order Calendar for May
26, 1977. It passed unanimously in the senate without debate. 137 The
next day a newspaper article quoted Senator Dunn as saying "[t]he
parts we took out are not essential to the RICO concept.' 3 8 The
article noted that RICO had undergone drastic changes, such as the
deletion of the wiretap and special dangerous racketeering provi-
sions and the misdemeanors in the definition of "racketeering activ-
ity."'
3
On May 30, 1977, the house passed House Bill 2127 as amended
by the senate, making only two minor changes. 4 ' The next day the
136. Id. (statement of Mr. Stone.)
137. FiA. S. JouR. 545 (Reg. Sess. 1977).
138. Florida Times-Union, May 27, 1977, § B, at 2, col. 3.
139. Id.
140. FLA. H.R. JouR. 848 (Reg. Ses. 1977). The house amended the senate's version of
RICO in two ways. It substituted the definitional heading of "pattern of racketeering activ-
ity" for "pattern of racketeering conduct." This change was necessary because RICO defines
"racketeering activity," not "racketeering conduct." Unfortunately, within the definition of
"pattern of racketeering activity," there remain the words "racketeering conduct."
The second amendment deleted a senate provision which provided:
It is an affirmative defense if the proceeds were used to purchase securities of
such enterprise on the open market without a purpose to control or participate in
the control of such enterprise, or to assist another person to do so, if the securities
of the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices
in any pattern of racketeering conduct after such purchase do not confer, either in
law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of such enterprise. The person
asserting such defense bears the burden of proof.
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senate passed RICO as amended by the house."' By June 25, 1977,
RICO had been engrossed, enrolled, and signed by the Governor."'
On October 1, 1977, RICO went into effect.
IV. PROPOSALS
Even if Florida courts construed the "pattern" element of RICO
narrowly, the presence of so many non-serious misdemeanors in the
definition of "racketeering activities" makes RICO much too broad.
If RICO is to be narrowed, that definition will have to be edited once
again. Other changes, especially changes in the definition of
"pattern," might help narrow RICO, but the key to the overbreadth
of RICO is in the definition of "racketeering activity."
The legislature should finish the editing of RICO by diligently
applying Senator Dunn's "felony rule" to the misdemeanors in the
definition of "racketeering activity." Using the standards estab-
lished by the Senate Judiciary-Criminal Committee, such an appli-
cation would result in a drastic reduction of the number of misde-
meanors in the definition of "racketeering activity.""
3
The legislature should also make RICO violations based on mis-
demeanors punishable as third-degree felonies. Of course, violations
based on felonies would continue to be first-degree felonies. This
proposal is reasonable if one believes that a pattern of robberies
should be more severely punished than a pattern of prostitution or
pornography violations. It is inequitable to sentence a person to one
year for committing a single misdemeanor and then, through RICO,
to sentence that person to thirty years for committing the same
misdemeanor in a pattern. Under this proposal the sentence for a
pattern of misdemeanors could still be up to five years.
The FEDRICO definition of "pattern of racketeering activity"
should be duplicated in the Florida statute. This would help Florida
courts follow the federal decisions which have properly required a
continuity of organized wrongdoing. As the FEDRICO expert ex-
plained to the Judiciary-Criminal Committee, RICO is based on the
theory that it is a crime to "commit a series of [individual criminal
acts] . . . held together in a pattern and . . . part of an ongoing
enterprise."'' 4 By adopting the definition in FEDRICO, the legisla-
141. FLA. S. Jov. 628 (Reg. Sess. 1977).
142. LEGISLATI E INFORMATION DISION, supra note 127, at 503.
143. The reasoning behind this proposal can also be applied to FA. STAT. § 943.461(2)3
(1977) which incorporates the entire chapter on usury in the Florida Statutes into the defini-
tion of "unlawful debt." By doing so, a person extending credit to another person and willfully
and knowingly charging 26% interest per annum violates RICO when he uses or invests the
proceeds in, or acquires or maintains an enterprise with the proceeds from the usurious debt.
144. Fla. S., Committee on Judiciary-Criminal, tape recording of proceedings (March 8,
1978]
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ture would be saving time and money in the fight against organized
crime because Florida courts could make use of the federal decisions
as to the meaning of "pattern of racketeering activity." Unless the
FEDRICO definition is adopted, the legislature cannot be sure that
RICO will be limited to the "ongoing enterprise." In fact, the RICO
definition will probably not be so limited because it is easy for "two
incidents of racketeering conduct .. .[to] have the same or simi-
lar intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of commis-
sion.""45
In addition, the legislature should amend Florida's wiretap stat-
ute so that law enforcement officials may intercept wire or oral
commqnications under judicial supervision when there is reasonable
cause to believe RICO is being violated."' Florida needs this amend-
ment because, as the legislature determined, "organized crime ex-
ists on a large scale within the State of Florida.1' 47 According to the
great majority of law enforcement officials, organized crime investi-
gations and prosecutions require the aid of electronic surveillance
techniques to gather evidence adequately."' The law enforcement
1977) (on file with committee).
145. FLA. STAT. § 943.461(4) (1977).
146. See generally id. ch. 934.
147. RICO, supra note 2, which in full provides:
WHEREAS, the Legislature finds that organized crime is a highly sophisticated,
diversified, and widespread problem which annually drains billions of dollars from
the national economy by various patterns of unlawful conduct, including the illegal
use of force, fraud, and corruption, and
WHEREAS, organized crime exists on a large scale within the State of Florida,
and it engages in the same patterns of unlawful conduct which characterize its
activities in other states, and
WHEREAS, seventeen of the twenty-one publicly identified organized crime
"families" are reported to operate within Florida, and because no single "family"
is considered by the other "families" to have exclusive dominion in the state,
Florida is considered by organized criminal operatives as an "open state" and other
organized criminal operatives are now migrating to Florida from other states, and
WHEREAS, organized crime is infiltrating and corrupting legitimate businesses
operating within this state and this infiltration and corruption uses vast amounts
of money, power, and all the techniques of violence, intimidation, and other forms
of unlawful conduct to accomplish its goals, and
WHEREAS, in furtherance of such infiltration and corruption, organized crimi-
nal operatives utilize and apply to their unlawful purposes laws of the State of
Florida conferring and relating to the privilege of engaging in various types of
business enterprises, and
WHEREAS, infiltration and corruption of legitimate business provide an outlet
for illegally obtained capital, harm innocent investors, entrepreneurs, merchants,
and consumers, interfere with free competition, and thereby constitute a substan-
tial danger to the economic and general welfare of the State of Florida, and
WHEREAS, in order to successfully resist and eliminate such infiltration, it is
necessary to provide new criminal and civil remedies and procedures. . ..
Id. at 1400.
148. THE PRESNrT's COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
FLORIDA RICO ACT
officials maintain that electronic surveillance techniques "are indis-
pensable to develop adequate strategic intelligence concerning or-
ganized crime, to set up specific investigations, to develop wit-
nesses, to corroborate their testimony, and to serve as substitutes
for them-each a necessary step in the evidence-gathering process
in organized crime investigations and prosecutions.""' 10
The Florida Legislature made a similar determination and found
such findings important enough to incorporate them in the Florida
Statutes: "Organized criminals make extensive use of wire and oral
communications in their criminal activities. The interception of
such communication to obtain evidence of the commission of crimes
or to prevent their commission is an indispensable aid to law en-
forcement and the administration of justice."'50 The words "any
violation of the Florida RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization) Act" could simply be added to the crimes enumer-
ated in the wiretap statute.
There are adequate safeguards in the wiretap statute for assuring
that wiretapping authority is not abused by law enforcement offi-
cials. Among other precautions, each application for a wiretap must
be made in writing to a judge of competent jurisdiction. 5' Either the
Governor, the attorney general, or a State's attorney must authorize
the application.152 The application must include details about the
offense being investigated, the place where the communications are
to be intercepted, the identity of the person committing the offense,
details about whose communications are to be intercepted, and in-
formation about how long the interception will be required. 5 3 To
issue an order authorizing a wiretap the judge must determine that
"[t]here is probable cause for belief that an individual is commit-
ting, has committed, or is about to commit" one of the enumerated
offenses in the statute.
54
A fifth and final proposal is merely technical-to substitute the
phrase "racketeering activity" for "racketeering conduct" in the
definition of "pattern of racketeering activity." This is necessary
because RICO defines "racketeering activity," not "racketeering
conduct."
TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME 201 (1967).
149. Id.
150. FLA. STAT. § 934.01(3) (1977).
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V. CONCLUSION
The very broad definition of "racketeering activity" makes the
RICO statute a potential candidate for prosecutorial abuse. Adop-
tion of the first proposal would provide more protection for Floridi-
ans from overzealous prosecutors by limiting the definition of
"pattern of racketeering activity" primarily to felonies. This would
allow Florida courts to follow the federal cases construing this diffi-
cult phrase. With those changes and with the adoption of the wire-
tap proposal, RICO could become a major weapon with which to
drive organized crime out of Florida without destroying "the per-
sonal liberties of Floridians." 55
155. Fla. S., tape recording of proceedings (May 4, 1977) (on file with secretary of senate)
(statement of Sen. Gordon).
